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ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
David Luban*
At this Symposium, we have heard about forms of law practice that raise
large questions about the lawyer's role. My sole theme in the present essay is
that we often ask the wrong large questions. Too often, the questions about
multidisciplinary practice ("MDP"), mediation and arbitration, and in-house
lawyering are whether they are good for lawyers and good for clients. These are
questions, I will suggest, that the market itself will decide. The right question is
not whether new roles with no rules are good for lawyers and clients, but rather
whether they are good for the rest of us-"us" being the citizenry who count on
lawyers to be guardians of the law, and who market forces will not necessarily
protect.1
All three of the new roles raise the interesting prospect of the lawyer's
traditional role dissolving into a different one as role boundaries blur and thin.
In MDP, the prospect is that lawyers become indistinguishable from accountants,
investment bankers, financial advisors, or business consultants. For in-house
lawyers, the prospect is that lawyers become indistinguishable from corporate
executives, or, more broadly, from clients. And for third-party neutrals, the
prospect is that lawyers become very much like judges.
I will not be discussing all three roles in this paper. My principal focus is on
multidisciplinary practice. The role of in-house counsel is a secondary focus, and
I shall not address the role of third-party neutral at all.
I.
Last year, I sat in an audience of law professors, listening to a debate on the
future of law practice. On one side was a partner in a venerable and famous
Manhattan law firm, extolling the virtues of traditional large-firm practice in
familiar terms. On the other was a lawyer from one of the Big Five accounting
firms. He was low-key and well-spoken, but what he delivered was a variant of
Nikita Krushchev's famous "We will bury you!" speech at the United Nations.
He made it clear that his firm intends to offer one-stop shopping to business
clients, to provide the proverbial seamless web of services, including legal

* Frederick Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. This paper has a secret co-author. Several weeks before I wrote it, I heard Robert Gordon
complain that the debate over multidisciplinary law practice ("MDP") was completely ignoring the
question of what effect MDP would have on the lawyer's role as a guardian of public norms. He
expressed considerable bemusement about the neglect of this question in published discussions of
MDP. That sounded right to me, and the present paper is my effort to raise in public the question that
Gordon raised in conversation. Of course Gordon bears no responsibility for the way I have
elaborated his question.
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services. To this end, he said, his firm will outbid any law firm for the services of
talented lawyers and new law graduates. Not only will it outbid the law firms, it
will hire lawyers by the hundreds and even the thousands-in fact, it will hire
lawyers in quantities that law firms can only gape at.2 "Quantities," I might add,
was very much the master-concept of his presentation, as he displayed one nifty
graph after another showing the irresistible lure the Big Five accounting firms
would soon be exerting to suck all the business in the world into themselves, like
black holes. Significantly-and no doubt as a deliberate provocation-he never
once used the word "client," invariably preferring the words "consumer" and
"customer."
The law professors in the audience walked away looking slightly green,
feeling rather old, shaking their heads and no doubt murmuring to themselves,
"0 brave new world!" But what exactly is the problem? The market will decide
whether the brave new world is good for lawyers and clients. Lawyers and other
financial professionals apparently wish to merge, and business clients apparently
want them to do so as well. If business clients subsequently find that their needs
are better met by traditional law firms, they will vote with their feet; and if their
feet lead them away from multidisciplinary financial firms' legal departments
back toward traditional law firms, lawyers' feet will follow and the MDP
experiment will fail. A June 1998 article in The American Lawyer about Arthur
Andersen's efforts to conquer the legal markets of Europe by buying up law
firms suggested that many lawyers were bailing out, because they did not like the
corporate mentality of the accounting firm; this is another issue on which the
3
market will have the last word.
The American Bar Association's worry has been that MDP will lead to an
erosion of the "core professional values" of independent judgment,
confidentiality, and loyalty.
But we are talking primarily about very
sophisticated business clients who will know better than the ABA does whether
they are being well-served by their lawyers. In this context, paternalism seems
singularly out of place.
One might object to the claim that all clients of MDPs are sophisticated
business clients: in its report to the ABA House of Delegates, the committee that
studied MDP used the example of a lawyer partnering with a financial planner
and social worker to help plan the affairs of senior citizens. 4 The choice of
example is disingenuous, however. If MDPs were all like the one in the example,
rest assure that there would never have been an ABA commission on the issue.
The debate has never been about how best to help Mom and Dad plan their
retirement. It is about high-end lawyers who want to merge with other high-end
financial professionals to compete more effectively for the business of the
Masters of the Universe. The Masters of the Universe did not acquire their

2. It is already the case that two of the four biggest "law firms" in the world are accounting firms.
ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPINARY PRACTICE AND RELATED TRENDS AFFECTING THE
PROFESSION 1 4 <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html> [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
3. John E. Morris, King Arthur's March on Europe,AM. LAW. 48,53 (June 1998).
4. ABA REPORT, supranote 2,

2.

1999]

ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS

riches by being dumb negotiators in their own self-interest, and they scarcely
need the solicitude of the organized bar, which cannot claim to understand their
interests better than they do. The rich really aren't like you and me, and they
transact their business with lawyers and bankers out of sight of our speculations.
We don't really know how they view their lawyers or what they say to them; why
second-guess them, then? We find similar phenomena in nature. Two miles
beneath the placid surface of the Pacific Ocean, far removed from the eyes of
observers, the sperm whale and the giant squid grapple in silent combat. Moby
Dick has no need of ABA commissions worrying that the squid may use an
illegal hold. Moby Dick knows what to do.
II.
But the rest of us may not know what to do about Moby Dick. Richard
Posner rightly points out that the incursion of competitive markets into the
cartelized legal profession is likely to enhance legal ethics if the term is
understood as heightened regard for the interests of consumers (pardon me:
"clients"), even as it makes life less pleasant for the producers, the lawyers
toiling away in gilded sweatshops. 5 Competitive markets are good for
consumers.
Almost as an afterthought, Posner observes that the
commercialization of the legal profession is likely to erode whatever protections
now exist of third-party interests: competitive pressure will make lawyers more
6
inclined to do the client's bidding without raising questions or objections.
Posner immediately drops the subject, but for those of us who believe that the
protection of third-party interests is one of the watershed issues in legal ethics,
dropping the subject is on a par with "apart from that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the
play?"
The problem is this: The advent of MDP thins the distinction between
lawyers and other financial professionals, in the same way that the role of inhouse counsel thins the distinction between lawyers and their clients. It is hardly
a secret that financial deal-makers, like many business clients, regard the law
with suspicion and even hostility-as a universe of red tape, bureaucratic
meddling, regulatory hindrance, and deadweight loss. As lawyers come to
occupy roles structurally similar to those of deal-makers and clients, it should not
surprise us if lawyers' approach to the law swings increasingly into alignment
with this jaundiced view.
Contrast this with one of the prominent alternative views of the lawyer's
role, occupying an honorable position among the bar's traditions. On this
alternative, the lawyer serves a unique and indispensable social function by
acting as a kind of mediator between private interests-those of the client-and
the public interest, represented by the law. 7 This way of describing the
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 92-93 (1995).
6. Id. at 93.
7. This view was elaborated by the sociologist Talcott Parsons, but it may already be found in
Tocqueville, and has been defended by such notable jurists as Louis Brandeis. See generally TALCOTr
PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370
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alternative comes from Talcott Parsons and Louis D. Brandeis, but it also has a
familiar counterpart in the contemporary bar's official self-understanding. As
the Preamble to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct puts it, "A
lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice."8
The root idea is that lawyers owe fealty not just to the client but to the law
(at least insofar as the law is just). The most prominent expression of this idea is
the familiar bromide that a lawyer is an "officer of the court." The meaning of
this formula is far from obvious, but it receives some tangible expression in the
rules of professional conduct. The clearest example is the lawyer's duty of
candor to the courts, which requires lawyers to reveal, if necessary, that a client
has committed a fraud on the court. By contrast, lawyers are forbidden from
9
revealing client frauds committed on anyone else.
The idea that lawyers have duties to the law as well as to their clients is
wider than the officer of the court concept, however. For one thing, it applies
outside of litigation settings, for example, in the requirement that lawyers decline
to assist clients in criminal or fraudulent schemes. 10 More importantly, it
represents an ideal of lawyering that transcends the formal rules of professional
conduct, an ideal that is sometimes described by the phrase "the independence
11
of lawyers."
The ABA report on multidisciplinary practice focuses exclusively on one
meaning of this ideal, namely lawyers' independence from nonlawyers who may
be paying their fees and who may have interests of their own, not necessarily
helpful to the client.12 Historically, the ideal had a second meaning as well: it
refers to the lawyer's independence from the state. For nineteenth-century
European liberals struggling to loosen the grip of the monarchical state, this was

(1964); TALCOTr PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL

THEORY 34 (1964); 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272-80 (Henry Reeve
trans., Phillips Bradley ed., Anchor Books 1963) (1835); LouIs D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the
Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 329 (1925). I discuss this tradition in David Luban, The Noblesse
Oblige Tradition in the Practiceof Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717 (1988).
8. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Preamble para. 1 (1998).
9. See id at Rule 3.3(a)(4) (requiring lawyer to disclose to tribunal material facts to avoid
assisting in crime or fraud); id at Rule 1.6 (forbidding lawyer from revealing certain information
related to client representation).
10. Id. at Rule 1.2(d). See also id. at Rule 1.16(a)(1) (requiring lawyer to withdraw if
representation will result in violation of law); id at Rule 1.16(b)(1) (permitting lawyer to withdraw if
client persists in course of action that lawyer believes to be criminal or fraudulent). My interpretation
of the rule as an expression of the Parsons-Brandeis ideal may not be valid if we consider only criminal
schemes, in which the requirement not to counsel or assist is nothing more than the demand not to be
an accomplice or enter into a criminal conspiracy-hardly a requirement that applies only to lawyers!
The interpretation is more plausible when we turn from criminal schemes to non-criminal frauds.
11. The fundamental American treatment of this ideal is Robert W. Gordon, The Independence
of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
12. The relevant Model Rules are 1.8(0 and 5.4, both of which forbid lawyers from allowing third
parties paying their fees to interfere with their judgment on behalf of clients. ABA MODEL RULES,
supra note 8, at Rules 1.8(0, 5.4.
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the notion of independence worth going to the barricades for.13 But a third
meaning is equally important: the lawyer is independent from the client.1 4 For
understandable reasons, this aspect of independence is not one that the bar
advertises, but like the others it too is implicit in the rules. Representing a client
does not entail endorsement of the client's objectives; 15 advocating for a client
doesn't mean believing that the client's cause is just;16 and, above all, advising a
client sometimes means telling the client that what he wants to do is against the
law and he shouldn't do it.
Although the Model Rule concerning lawyers as advisors does not put this
last proposition as indelicately as I just have, 17 the proposition is central to the
ABA Model Rules' justification of confidentiality. Many people suspect that
confidentiality permits clients to conceal wrongdoing. To counter this commonsense fear, the ABA insists that confidentiality actually enhances client
compliance with the law. Confidentiality encourages clients to seek their
lawyers' advice, and, the commentators assure us, "[b]ased upon experience,
lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is
upheld. '18 Regardless of whether you believe this assurance, the important
point to note is that it presumes that lawyers are in there pitching for their clients
to uphold the law. If so, then no doubt clients often don't like to hear it-but,
the Comment implies, lawyers are supposed to dish it out anyway. That is what
independence is about.
Independence of this sort may already be a scarce commodity in traditional
law practice, where lawyers competing for clients may be understandably
reluctant to tell their clients that they can't do what they want to do. But it's
vital to ask whether the ideal of independence can thrive in the context of MDP
or, for that matter, in-house counsel, where the lawyer's role has to a large
degree blended with those of people whose attitude to the law is often that of

13. See, e.g., DiETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN GERMANY AND IN THE UNITED STATES 174-75 (1973)

(discussing legal profession in Germany in the nineteenth century).
14. Interestingly, this meaning is explicitly acknowledged and centrally important in Germany.
The Federal Lawyers' Act (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung)and the code of legal ethics (the so-called
"Richtlinien" or Grundsatze des anwaltlichen Standesrechts) both begin with the fundamental
principle, "a lawyer is an independent organ of the administration of justice" (Rechtspflege). BRAO §
1; RICrHLRA, Vorspruch § 1. The leading commentaries all agree that this means independence from
the client as well as the state. For discussion and references, see David Luban, The Sources of Legal
Ethics: A German-American Comparison of Lawyers' ProfessionalDuties, 48 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 245,266-67 (1984).

15. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 8, at Rule 1.2(b) (stating that client representation does
not amount to endorsement of client's views).
16. Id. at Rule 3.4(e) (prohibiting attorneys from stating their own views during trial).
17. "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation." Id at Rule 2.1.
1& Id at Rule 1.6 cmt. 3.
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Holmes's "bad man." 19 The bad man cares nothing about the law beyond
whatever effect its enforcement may have on his own interests. Holmes
provokes his readers by insisting that the bad man's jurisprudence is largely
right. However, many readers fail to notice that on the very same page where
Holmes sings the praises of the bad man, he insists that lawyers are by and large
good men and good citizens. 20 On this issue, even Holmes was a traditionalist.
The question we are entitled to have answered is: what happens to the
enforcement of legal norms when lawyers, too, occupy the structural role of
Holmes's bad man?
Let me pose my complaint about asking the wrong question in somewhat
different terms. For decades, the bar has been embroiled in a profound
collective introspection about commercial values supplanting professional
values. Viewed from the standpoint of this distinction, the debate about MDP,
like the debate between the law firm and the accounting firm lawyers I described
above, is another manifestation of the battle between professionalism and
commercialism, symbolized by the decision over whether to refer to legal
employers as clients or consumers, that is, customers.
There is, however, another distinction more familiar to political
philosophers than to analysts of legal ethics. This is the distinction between
consumers and citizens. As a consumer, I am a participant in markets. My aim is
to enhance my own well-being, by satisfying my preferences, which I express
through market behavior. As a citizen, my concern is different. It is a concern
not with what is best for me but with what is right for us. My aim is to participate
in deliberation with my fellows, and I consider not only my preferences but my
(and our) values as well. Frequently, my consumer preferences coincide with the
values I support as a citizen; sometimes, however, they do not. I may, for
example, support higher taxes on people like me, because I believe it would be
better for my community; I may vote against a new dam on environmentalist
grounds even though if it is not built my own electric bill will go up. 21 Because
our aims as consumers and citizens are somewhat schizophrenic, public and
private life both require a never-ending negotiation between consumer values
and citizen values. In Emile, Rousseau painted a one-sided picture of the ideal
citizen as someone who cares only for his city, never for himself.22 But we are

19. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 171
(1920).

20. Id.
21. The distinction between citizen and consumer has been explored by Mark Sagoff in a series
of elegant articles in the 1980s. Many of these were eventually incorporated into his book, The
Economy of the Earth. See generally MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY,
LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988).
22. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE, OR ON EDUCATION 40 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books
ed. 1979). Rousseau wrote:
The Lacedaemonian Pedaretus runs for the council of three hundred. He is defeated. He
goes home delighted that there were three hundred men worthier than he to be found in
Sparta. I take this display to be sincere, and there is reason to believe that it was. This is the
citizen.
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not like that, nor should we be; in both inner and outer life, consumer and citizen
roles constantly threaten to undermine each other. We must give both their due,
and that is not an easy task.
The output of citizen activity is, typically, the output of government: lawthe formal expression of public values. When Talcott Parsons described lawyers
as mediators between the private interests of clients and the public interests
expressed in law, he was suggesting that lawyers play an indispensable role in
carrying out the negotiation between public values and private preferences.
There are few settings that more purely reflect the schizophrenia of public and
private values than transacting commerce in a regulatory state. It is the lawyer's
role in negotiating this delicate dialectic, hence the very meaning of public values
to the legal profession, that the ideal of independence aims to preserve, and that
the capture of lawyers by third parties or by customers threatens.
And my complaint is that we are not asking about the threat to this role.
III.
The question assumes that the Brandeis-Parsons ideal of the lawyer's role as
public citizen is correct, and that assumption may lead some to roll their eyes.
As Robert Gordon observes, "when lawyers start talking this way about their
public duties .... most of us understand that we have left ordinary life far behind
for the hazy aspirational world of the Law Day sermon and Bar Association
after-dinner speech-inspirational, boozily solemn, anything but real. '23 I want
to defend the ideal of independence by working through five objections to taking
it seriously. The first is that these ideas rest on an impossibly romantic
conception of law as the expression of public values. The second is that they rest
on a knee-jerk conservative equation of law, public values, and goodness. The
third is that lawyers need be no more committed to the law than anyone else.
The fourth is that these concerns rest on a mistaken conception of lawyers' role,
one that wholly neglects the fact that it is a client-centered, adversarial one. And
the fifth is that even if the Parsonian analysis of the lawyer's role is correct,
legally-trained people in MDPs or in-house positions can simply define new roles
for themselves. 24 Only the last, I believe, has merit-and once we see the merit
A Spartan woman had five sons in the army and was awaiting news of the battle. A Helot
arrives; trembling, she asks him for news. "Your five sons were killed." "Base slave, did I
ask you that?" "We won the victory." The mother runs to the temple and gives thanks to
the gods. This is the female citizen.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
23. Gordon, supranote 11, at 13.
24. There is a sixth rejoinder as well, perhaps the least familiar but in some ways the most
interesting. That is the point, developed in numerous essays and books by Lon Fuller, that the sharp
distinction between citizen and consumer-state and civil society, in the terminology of nineteenthcentury political economy-is excessively statist and, in the final analysis, misunderstands the pluralist
nature of law. In Fuller's eyes, law arises whenever human beings subject their own conduct to the
governance of rules, whether or not these rules are made by the state; thus, the law in a contract is just
as much "contract law" as the law governing its formation.
I believe that it is possible to recast the distinction between public norms and private interests
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it has, we will understand how important the unasked question becomes.
IV.
Consider first, then, what I will call the public choice response to concerns
that lawyers in MDP, and in-house counsel, may not fulfill the role of guarding
public values. Who says that law expresses public values? Law gets made by
public officials who are no less self-interested rational actors than the rest of us.
Law is, essentially, bought, through the familiar processes of interest group
politics. As Richard Posner expounds the economic theory of legislation, the
political "process creates a market for legislation in which legislators 'sell'
legislative protection to those who can help their electoral prospects with money
or votes." 25 The entire framework of economic regulations represents, as a
consequence, nothing more than the triumph of some private interests over
others. Morally speaking, then, there is no reason at all why business clients
should genuflect before the law. Regulations are simply one more obstacle
thrown up by market competitors against each other, and there is no reason for
lawyers or clients to treat them as anything other than obstacles. There is no
reason not to push the envelope, or play the enforcement lottery, or invent
ingenious methods of contracting around the law. The Brandeis-Parsons ideal of
the lawyer as guardian of the boundary between public and private interests is,
from the standpoint of political and economic reality, basically absurd.
This is not a preposterous point of view; it is, on the contrary, an important
and cogent one, widely believed by knowledgeable people. It is also, however,
an exaggerated point of view, and once we recognize its exaggerations, the
conclusion it draws, that the ideal of the lawyer as public citizen is absurd, no
longer follows.
In its academic form, the public choice argument simply postulates that all
politicians are self-interested rational actors and that all law is the result of
market activity: the rational-actor model is an assumption, not a conclusion, of
the theory. In its own way, this assumption is just as abstract and one-sided as
Rousseau's, in effect denying that legislators have even a single non-selfinterested thought. The model would have to be taken seriously if it was backed
by a wealth of empirical confirmation; but the theory has proven notoriously
disappointing on the empirical front.26 In its non-academic form-the form you
even in a legal pluralist framework such as Fuller's, but that is an excursion for another paper. See
generally LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981).
25. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.3 (4th ed. 1992). As Jonathan R.
Macey puts it, "[i]nterest group theory treats statutes as commodities that are purchased by particular
interest groups or coalitions of interest groups that outbid and outmaneuver competing interest
groups."
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 227 (1986). See generally DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).

26. On this issue, the by-now-standard work is that of Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro. They
carefully review hundreds of political science studies in the public-choice tradition and find them by
and large either unfalsifiable or falsified. See generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIOUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL
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hear talking with lobbyists, journalists, lawyers, and politicians-the conclusion
is not nearly so drastic. True, a first peek into the legislative sausage factory is
indescribably revolting. A second glance shows, among the horse-traders, men
and women of principle making decisions of principle on a daily basis. There is
no reason to assume that all law is bought law, or that law should be read as
nothing more than the terms of a horse-trade. Some law will fit this description,
some will not.
Consider, then, a lawyer in the important role of compliance counselor to a
regulated business, or a due diligence opinion letter writer in a large-scale deal.
Because some legislation is bought legislation, the lawyer cannot assume a priori
that the law she is dealing with is a genuine reflection of public values; nor,
however, can she assume that it is simply sausage from the sausage factory,
reflecting nothing more than a process of venality and vote-buying. Instead, she
must range it on a scale of which these are merely the extremes, and consider to
what extent it deserves good faith compliance and to what extent it should be
treated as a mere obstacle. In his path-breaking treatment of compliance
counseling, Robert Gordon has identified over a dozen distinct stances a lawyer
may advise a client to take, depending on where she locates the law on the public
values/private sausage continuum. 27 The lawyer can recommend complying with
the letter of regulation but not the spirit; or the letter and the spirit; or arguing to
regulators that a business plan complies with the spirit, even though it does not
comply with the letter; or resisting the regulators; or recasting a prohibited
business plan in a cosmetically different but substantively identical form; or
playing the enforcement lottery; or avoiding a technically lawful course of action
because outsiders might perceive it as harsh or unfair.
In effect, then, recognizing that the public choice theory is intermittently
true vests more discretion in lawyers to be Brandeis-Parsons public citizens, not
less. Now the lawyer is not merely to mediate between public and private
interests, but also to determine whether the law confronting her actually
represents public interests. But, one might ask, why is this the lawyer's
responsibility? Because she is schooled in the law, and, more importantly,
because compliance counseling or due diligence is her job.
Public choice theorists will not yet be convinced that lawyers owe any
responsibilities to mediate between private interests and public norms. For, in
addition to the argument that all legislation is bought legislation, academic
theorists sometimes offer another argument, aiming to show that the very
concept of a public value or public interest is incoherent, at least if the concept
refers to the outcome of rational and democratic deliberation (like Rousseau's
"general will"). The discoveries of social choice theory, including Arrow's
theorem and its more sophisticated progeny such as the theorems of McKelvey
and Schofield, demonstrate that there is no such thing as a decision that is
simultaneously rational and democratic: strangely enough, even quite minimal
assumptions about rationality and democracy turn out to be demonstrably
SCIENCE (1994).

27. Gordon, supra note 11, at 26-27.
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inconsistent. 28 If so, then the very idea of law as the expression of public values
rests on a mistake, and it would be equally mistaken to define lawyers' ethical
obligations as the ABA does, as "public citizens."
I shall say very little to respond to this argument, because I believe that it
turns out to be more of a mathematical curiosity than a genuine paradox. Each
of the principal theorems of social choice theory depends on mathematical
assumptions that turn out to be remarkably strong-strong enough that they do
not really model the democratic process as we ordinarily conceive of it. Thus,
the McKelvey and Schofield theorems assume that there are infinitely many
available choices, while Arrow's theorem assumes that choices are always voted
on two at a time, without the vote being influenced by the availability of other
alternatives; Arrow's theorem also assumes that voters are allowed to cast
ballots for choices that other voters have already excluded as a matter of legal
right. 29 Without these assumptions, the troubling theorems cannot be proven;
and, of course, there is no need to accept the assumptions. Whatever its other
infirmities, the notion of lawyers as public citizens need not be abandoned on the
ground of intellectual incoherence.
V.
Skepticism about the moral authority of public norms can come from other
directions besides the generally conservative outlook of public choice theorists.
Consider, for example, the perspective of a Christian radical such as Thomas
Shaffer. In a recent essay, Shaffer offers the example of his own representation
of immigrants who the Immigration and Naturalization Service is attempting to
trick into making admissions that will render them deportable. 3° Shaffer is
bemused at the idea "that the INS deserves cooperation or even candor from an
honest person-or from her lawyer." 31 He explains:
The INS is, after all, an arbitrary, unreviewable, disgusting
bureaucracy.... And the immigration laws of the United States are,
from the perspective of biblical justice, as immoral as Pharaoh
demanding more bricks.... I might come to suggest an analogy
between INS rules and the demand of the Roman state that Christians
28. See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982) (examining
theory of democratic process and social decision making); KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIvIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) (deriving a paradox of social choice); Richard D. McKelvey,
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1085
(1979) (same); Norman Schofield, Instability of Simple Dynamic Games, 45 REv. ECON. STUD. 575
(1978) (same).
29. See David Luban, Social Choice Theory as Jurisprudence,69 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 522 (1996)
(discussing Arrow, McKelvey, and Schofield theorems); see also id at 567-71 (discussing McKelvey
and Schofield theorems); iadat 574 (discussing Arrow's assumption of pairwise voting); id. at 522, 55658, 580-86 (discussing Arrow's assumption that voters may cast ballots for choices that other voters
have excluded by right and demonstrating that without this assumption Arrow's theorem fails).
30. Thomas L Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Up for Simon's Practice of Justice?, 51
STAN. L REv. 903,911-13 (1999).
31. Id at 912.
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in the early church worship the emperor. That would be a way for a
modem American lawyer to think about her radical Christian
heritage. 32
Genuflecting before public norms is a form of idolatry. Writing in a similar
vein, Robin West asks, "Is our law really that good? What happens if it falls
from grace? What happens if our deepest, most fundamental, most basic law,
when best read in its most moral light, takes a disastrously bad, immoral, evil
33
turn and becomes utterly, inarguably unjust? What if it already has?"
What distinguishes Shaffer and West from the public choice objectors is that
the former worry that legal norms may oppress the weak, whereas the latter
typically dislike the possibility that they may hamper the strong, the overdogs.
The difference in emphasis is enormous, but the response is the same. The ideal
of the lawyer as public citizen requires lawyers to mediate between public norms
and private interests. As we have seen, that doesn't mean siding invariably with
the bad man, but neither does it mean invariably siding with the state. When the
law has become as oppressive as Shaffer and West suggest it may, then the
Brandeis-Parsons lawyer must be a resolute defender of the interests of the
oppressed. She should give the law exactly the respect it deserves-none at all.
Brandeis's point was that lawyers are perfectly situated to comprehend both
aspects of the relationship between norms and persons. Public citizens will
regard it as part of their obligation to fight public injustices.
VI.
But why must lawyers be so tiresomely civic-minded? Two decades ago,
Charles Fried voiced the following well-taken complaint:
Some of the more ecstatic critics have put forward the lawyer as some
kind of anointed priest of justice.... But this is wrong. In a democratic
society, justice has no anointed priests. Every citizen has the same
duty to work for the establishment of just institutions, and the lawyer
has no special moral responsibilities in that regard. 34
I think that Fried is largely right, and indeed his comment may be right even
in non-democratic societies. What is not right, however, is Fried's insinuation
that anyone who believes Brandeis's and Parson's notion of law practice regards
lawyers as anointed priests of justice. Fried's imagery is overblown and
tendentious. If lawyers have special responsibilities to legal justice, that is not
because they are divinely elected, or better and holier that the rest of us. It is
because of how their role fits into an entire division of social labor. Lawyers
represent private parties before public institutions, or advise private parties
about the requirements of public norms, or reduce private transactions to a
publicly-prescribed form, or ratify that transactions are in compliance with public
32. Id.at 912-13.
33. Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less than Ideal Legal World, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 973,984 (1999) (emphasis in original).
34. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1080 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
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norms. To say that they have special duties of fidelity to those norms is no more
ecstatic and supernatural than saying that food-preparers have heightened duties
to ensure their hands are clean. It is their social role, not the brush of angels'
wings on their foreheads, that requires them to wash their hands every time they
go to the bathroom. Indeed, even Fried acknowledges that "the lawyer like any
citizen must use all his knowledge and talent to fulfill that general duty of
citizenship, and this may mean that there are special perspectives and
opportunitiesfor him. '35 "The Opportunity in the Law," let's not forget, is the
title of Brandeis's speech expounding the vision of the lawyer as mediator
between public and private interests.
Someone might respond that I have still not explained why nonlawyers are
entitled to adopt the bad man's point of view-treating the law in an entirely
instrumental fashion, calling it "sir" only because that's what you call a sixhundred-pound gorilla-whereas lawyers owe the law moral respect, and are
supposed to mean it when they say "sir."
If the objection means to deny that nonlawyers owe what Fried calls the
general duty of citizenship, my reply is that this is a mistake. 36 When law is
unjust or pernicious, we owe it no allegiance, but so long as law is reasonable, I
believe that all citizens have a prima facie obligation to respect the law. There is
no moral permission to be a bad man; that, I take it, is why Holmes picked the
word "bad."
If, on the other hand, the objection means that the duties of citizenship
require no more than bare-minimum compliance with the law, I will concede that
in many contexts this might be true of nonlawyers, but not of the legal
profession, which has been granted an exclusive and valuable monopoly on legal
services, for which the quid pro quo is a stance rather different from bare-bones
37
compliance-a stance that I have elsewhere described as trusteeship.
Let me explain the metaphor. Ideally, law is a product of the community,
acting through its government; but law is "vended" or distributed by a private
party-the legal profession. This places lawyers in a relationship akin to
trusteeship-a relationship in which one party creates a good for the benefit of
someone else, and the two parties jointly compensate a third person, the trustee,
to administer the good and ensure that the second party enjoys its benefits. In
this case, the community creates the good of law for the benefit of its members,
and entrusts it to the legal profession to administer. The legal profession is
compensated by clients in the form of legal fees and by the community in the
form of a lucrative monopoly, which boosts the income and prestige of the
profession's members. Obviously, the purpose of permitting the monopoly is not

35. 1d. (emphasis added).
36. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY ch. 3 (1988) (elaborating
on the circumstances in which we do or do not have an obligation to acknowledge the law's moral
authority); see generally David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for Conscientious Lawbreakers, 52 U.
PrITr. L. REv. 793 (1991).
37. See David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58, 6366 (1999) (defending this view).
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to do lawyers a favor, just as the creator of a trust is not aiming to do the trustee
a favor. The purpose is to ensure that the aims of the community, understood
collectively, are carried out for the benefit of the community's members, taken
individually. The purpose is, in other words, to mediate between the roles of
citizens and consumers, the public aims embodied in the law and the private
interests of clients. The argument vindicating the trusteeship metaphor is, in a
sense, the justification of the Brandeis-Parsons ideal of lawyerly independence.
VII.
It might be said that all this overlooks the fact that law is an adversarial
profession. The ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility-the Model Rules'
predecessor-includes a section entitled "Duty of the Lawyer to the Adversary
System of Justice," and states flat-out: "The duty of a lawyer to his client and his
duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously within the
bounds of the law." 38 On this analysis, the principal public norm governing
lawyers is the norm instructing them to advocate private interests with zeal,
rather than mediating between those interests and a public interest that is often
inimical to clients.
I will not spill any ink here discussing the pros and cons of the adversary
system; I have done so in other places. 39 In the present context, it suffices to
notice that when we discuss the non-traditional roles of lawyers in MDP, or inhouse counsel, we are typically talking about lawyers outside the courtroomoutside, that is, of the network of formal rules and the impartial referee that help
restrain the excesses of adversarial zeal in adjudication. Even the strongest
defenders-perhaps I should say especially the strongest defenders-of the
adversary system believe that the lawyer's role in the courtroom is morally
unique. Defending an armed robber doesn't make you an accomplice, and thus
lawyers in the adversary courtroom claim that they are not accountable for the
ends their clients pursue or the lawful means they employ. The criminal
defender's ethos of maximum zeal and minimum moral accountability is what we
often think of as an adversarial ethic.
I have argued that even in the courtroom the adversarial ethic is more
problematic than its defenders often believe. 4° Outside the courtroom, in the
context of business transactions, it is outrageous to enter a blanket claim of
moral non-accountability. In its pure form, the adversarial ethic discounts to
38. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1982)
39. See David Luban, Twenty Theses on Adversarial Ethics, in BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL
SYSTEM 134 (Helen Stacy & Michael Lavarch eds., 1999); LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note
36, at chs. 4-5 (considering ethical obligations of attorneys within adversarial system); see also David
Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS'

ETHICS 83-123 (David Luban ed., 1983) (discussing the conflict inherent in lawyer's ethical obligations
in the adversarial system).
40. I should add that in my view the claim of moral non-accountability is often unjustified. See
generally Luban, Twenty Theses on Adversarial Ethics, supra note 39; Luban, The Adversary System
Excuse, supra note 39 (discussing lawyers' ethical obligations in adversary context); LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE, supra note 36, at chs. 6-8 (discussing lawyers' role and moral obligations).
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zero the interests of everyone but the client; why should financial advisors and
business consultants be held morally non-accountable if they do that? No client
would win our assent if he claimed that looking out for Number One is the sole
valid moral rule; outside the Ayn Rand cult, we do not identify morality with
egoism. What makes looking out for Number Two any better?
This point is very important. We countenance the adversarial ethic, when
we do, for very specialized reasons deriving from the structure and goals of the
adjudicatory system. It is very much an advocate's ethic, bound up tightly with
the reasons that justify the traditional advocate's role. When we move to new
roles, in which the boundary between lawyers and business consultants or
business clients thins, those reasons no longer apply, and neither does the
adversary system excuse. So, outside of the specialized setting of litigation, there
is no reason to think that the duties of a lawyer's role deviate in any substantial
way from the Brandeis-Parsons model of the lawyer as trustee.
VIII.
On the other hand, no one says that if you go to law school you have to
become a lawyer. Suppose that a partner in a large accounting firm or a
corporate manager decides that she will be able to do her job better if she
becomes learned in the law. She goes to law school at night; having done well,
she sees no reason not to take the bar exam, which she passes with flying colors.
But her intention was never to stop working at her day job, and she has no
intention of practicing law. She realizes that her new credential helps her out in
multidisciplinary settings, or allows her to do the same kind of thing as her
corporation's in-house counsel. That's why she suffered through four years of
evening classes in law school. But she insists that she would do exactly the same
work-related things even if she had elected not to take the bar exam; indeed, she
simply doesn't see why her decision to read law magically transmogrifies her
moral obligations and makes her a trustee of the law.
As Arthur Applbaum has observed, one could make the same argument
about doctors. 41 Is it acceptable for a doctor to deliver limited-purpose services,
perhaps in a penny-pinching HMO, or perhaps doing physicals for employers
and insurance companies, where the job description does not include telling the
examinees about their conditions? An essentialist about the professions might
argue that non-Hippocratic medicine of this sort is inconsistent with the nature
of the doctor's role; to which the response might be, "Very well, then, let's agree
not to call me a doctor. Call me a schmoctor, which denotes a medically-trained
person who practices non-Hippocratic medicine." Doctor, schmoctor. Who says
you can't be a schmoctor?
Clearly, the same point could be made by our brave new lawyer-sorry,
schmawyer. If the lawyer's role really comes freighted with a Brandeis-Parsons
albatross about its neck, law graduates recruited by Big Five accounting firms or

41. ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC
AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 48-51 (1999) (introducing the "schmoctor" terminology).

1999]

ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS

Fortune 500 corporations might well settle for the less exalted but more downto-earth and lucrative role of schmawyer. The schmawyer is simply a legallytrained and knowledgeable person doing non-legal work with a legal component,
as in MDP, or doing legal work for a client from whom she is in no sense
independent, as in in-house counsel.
Lest this seem like a contrived philosopher's example, we should recall that
in many nations, only a miniscule proportion of law graduates become lawyers;
the majority go to work for corporations. In Germany, there is a sharp
in-house counseldistinction between lawyers-Rechtsanwilte-and
Syndikusanwailte. The German code of legal ethics incorporates a rule entitled
"Protection of Professional Independence," which forbids a lawyer from
entering into relationships that threaten his independence, conspicuously
including working in-house for a corporation. 42 The Syndikusanwalt cannot join
the bar to become a Rechtsanwalt, because he cannot comply with the
requirement of professional independence from his employers. 43 The Syndikus
is a schmawyer.
In the United States, of course, no rules prevent corporate counsel from
joining the bar; our profession, unlike that of Germany, is not formally
segmented. One way of defending the traditional lawyer's role against the
schmawyer is to argue that if our would-be schmawyer takes the oath and joins
the bar, she is now a lawyer whether she likes it or not; and if she doesn't join the
bar, she is guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Although this conclusion is
comforting to traditionalists, the argument is weak. In the kind of law practice
for which multidisciplinary firms are designed, the concept of unauthorized
practice does not mean much: it means only that the organized bar has
negotiated treaties with other powerful professions (accountants, bankers) over
what does and does not count as the practice of law. It would be a mistake, I
think, to regard the outcome of those treaties as a distinction of abiding moral
significance. Because drawing a sharp distinction between authorized and
unauthorized practice has so little to recommend it, the formalistic question of
whether a schmawyer has joined the bar cannot bear the weight that this
argument places on it. There's more to being a lawyer than that. What
distinguishes a lawyer from a schmawyer, Parsons would insist, is the functional
role each plays within social structure. And our would-be schmawyer is on
strong ground when she insists that her functional role is much closer to her prelaw-school career than it is to the traditional lawyer's role. If the bar tries to
enforce unauthorized practice statutes against her, she would be right to
complain that what is speaking is nothing more than the anti-competitive voice
of self-interest. 44
42. RIcHTLRA § 40.
43. In German criminal trials, the defendant does not testify under oath, to avoid creating a
perjury trap for him. Here, too, German rules seem much more realistic in their sense of how much
self-immolation it is reasonable to expect of ordinary human beings.
44. Too often, this is true at the low end of legal services as well. State bars usually invoke the
prohibition to drive cut-rate competitors out of business. A typical case is Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh,
where a proprietor of a typing service was found guilty of unauthorized practice, after she instructed
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Yet the argument that joining the bar makes you a lawyer, not a schmawyer,
has a point. Along with the duties incumbent on licensed lawyers, there are also
privileges, notably the attorney-client privilege, which makes the services of
lawyers substantially more valuable to clients than they would be without the
privilege. Similarly, lawyers are bound by a state-enforced ethics code.
Although it may be startling and counter-intuitive to describe this as a valuable
privilege, the reassurance or "halo" value it offers clients is considerable-it is, in
effect, the non-waivable contractual minimum package that comes with retaining
a lawyer. It includes, among other things, a duty of confidentiality that is far
broader than the attorney-client privilege.
Now, it seems to me that the schmawyer shouldn't receive any of these
perks of lawyers. The reason is illustrated in the simplest way by considering the
arguments justifying the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality.
In both cases, the argument is not simply that it is good for lawyers and clients to
be able to consult confidentially-the argument is that lawyers and clients being
able to consult confidentially is good for the legal system. Within the context of
adversary adjudication, the argument takes the form of claims that
confidentiality is necessary so that clients will tell their lawyers all the
information that the lawyers need to represent them with the informed zeal that
the system demands. In the context of office practice, the argument is the one
we examined briefly earlier in this paper: that confidentiality is necessary so that
clients will tell their lawyers all the information that the lawyers need to know
when the clients are about to break the law so they can talk their clients out of it.
These are public purposes, part of the deal that the community offers lawyers
when it makes them trustees of the law. That presumes that good lawyers are
Brandeis-Parsons lawyers.
But there is no such presumption about schmawyers. If it's schmawyers
we're talking about, who will not try to talk the client out of violating the law
because the schmawyer is functionally identical to the client, then the evidentiary
privilege and the court-enforced duty of confidentiality do little more than
facilitate cover-ups.
My suggestion, then, is the following: We must ask realistically whether the
new forms of practice are variations on the traditional lawyer's role as public
citizen. If the answer is "yes," then we can proceed to address the bar's question
about how best to protect core lawyer values in new settings. But if the answer is
"no," so that what we confront is not a lawyer but a schmawyer, then there is no
reason to grant any of the unique privileges of lawyers to them. In effect, this is
precisely the way that Germany treats the Syndikus. It's a way of recognizing
that knowledge of the law is for anyone who wishes to acquire it, for any purpose
whatever; that knowledge of the law need not carry any special Brandeis-Parsons
obligations with it; but that, by the same token, without any obligations there is

customers about how to fill out do-it-yourself legal forms. 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978). See Deborah L.
Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutionaland Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 44-97 (1981) (discussing constitutional implications of
unauthorized practice prohibitions).
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no reason to grant any privileges. A business person can lead an honorable and
satisfying life without being a lawyer, and this is no less true if she has a law
degree. There's no shame in being a Syndikus. It's simply a different honorable
and satisfying life than that of a lawyer.
Ix.
By this time, any reader who practices law in an accounting firm, or inhouse with a business corporation, may feel like challenging me to a duel. I have
been insulting their professional independence and lawyerly integrity, in effect
suggesting that they be disbarred merely because they don't work for a law firm.
Of course I have been doing nothing of the sort. I mean to draw no
conclusions about the actual nature of MDP or in-house counsel. At best they
would be premature. It is quite possible that lawyers in these settings fulfill the
Brandeis-Parsons idea of a lawyer just as well, or better, than their counterparts
in traditional legal settings. Nothing in this paper should be taken to suppose
otherwise.
I am arguing that the incentives in MDP and in-house lawyering will make it
harder to maintain independence, so that the concern about lawyers becoming
schmawyers has a firm basis in common-sense psychology and economics. Some
years ago, Robert Eli Rosen completed an important study of in-house counsel,
many of whom believe that, the incentives notwithstanding, house counsel play a
vital role in upholding the values of public justice. 45 If so, that should come as
welcome news; Rosen reserves judgment. 46 My point is only that until we ask
the kind of question that Rosen tried to answer, our speculations about the
nature of new lawyer roles will be, in an important sense, irrelevant to the main
issue that matters in legal ethics.

45. Robert E. Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, ProfessionalJudgment and Organizational
Representation,64 IND. LJ. 479,519-36 (1989) (discussing claims of Inside Counsel Movement).
46. Id. at 553 (arguing that whatever virtue inside counsel possess lies in their political power, not
their independence).
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